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LIMITED PARTNER CONTROL AND LIABILITY UNDER THE
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
by Michael K Pierce
Both the limited and general partnership share many of the same attrib-
utes.' The primary characteristic differentiating the two is the fact that
limited partners, unlike general partners, are liable for partnership obliga-
tions only to the extent of their capital contributions.2 Under statutes
modeled after the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, however, this limita-
tion of liability may be lost if a limited partner takes part in the "control"
of the business.' Thus, to attorneys with the responsibility of organizing a
limited partnership, and to the limited partners themselves, it is a matter of
prime importance that a control threshold be identified. Unfortunately,
neither the Uniform Act nor the decisiops construing it provide a clear
guide as to what constitutes control, creating much uncertainty as to what
a permissible amount of participation in the affairs of a partnership might
be. One commentator has called this resulting uncertainty "the greatest
drawback of the limited partnership form."4
In 1976 the uniform law was revised for the first time since its inception
in 1916. The drafters of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,'
among other things, attempted to provide a clearer definition of control.
This Comment examines this new provision and attempts to ascertain
whether it is, in fact, a more workable standard.
I. "CONTROL" UNDER THE ULPA
A. Background
At common law the general rule was that whoever enjoyed a right to
share in the profits of a noncorporate enterprise must also share in its
losses;6 thus, limited partnerships were unknown.7 In 1822 New York be-
came the first state to pass a limited partnership act, modeling its statute
1. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 26(c), at 150 (1968).
2. 2 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 39.07(2)(a) (rev.
ed. 1978).
3. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 [hereinafter referred to and cited as
ULPAI.
4. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(c), at 147.
5. REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (adopted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, subject to revision by the Style Committee)
[hereinafter referred to as RULPA or revised Act and cited as RULPA].
6. A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(a); Basye, 4 Survey of the Limited-Partnership
Form of Business Organization, 42 ORE. L. REV. 35, 36 (1962); Note, 36 HARV. L. REV. 1016,
1016-17 (1923).
7. See Hoefer v. Hall, 75 N.M. 751, 411 P.2d 230, 232 (1965); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305
N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732,
735 (1939); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 29 (2d ed. 1970).
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after the Socfee en Commendile of the French Commercial Code, a form
of limited partnership that had existed in France since the Middle Ages.'
Other states soon followed New York's example with similar laws
designed to counteract the common law doctrine.9 The legislative intent in
passing such legislation was to develop new sources of capital and foster
greater business and trade.'0
Despite passage of the limited partnership acts, judicial thinking per-
sisted that anyone with an interest in a partnership should be responsible
for the obligations of the partnership regardless of his contribution." As a
result, many courts regarded the limited partnership form as providing a
special privilege to the limited partner, and therefore they construed the
statutes strictly, allowing the privilege of operating as a limited partner
only after absolute compliance with all statutory requirements. 2 Any mi-
nor deviation from the statutory requirements rendered the limited partner
liable as a general partner, despite the lack of any actual intent to deceive
or reliance by a creditor."' Furthermore, the fact that the acts were in
derogation of the common law compelled some courts to require rigid ad-
herence to the statutory provisions.' 4 The danger of incurring unlimited
liability from relatively minor infractions of the law naturally discouraged
the use of limited partnerships by investors.' 5
B. The ULPA
The ULPA was drafted in large part to remedy the strict interpretation
given its predecessors.' 6 Thus, the ULPA abrogates the rule that legisla-
tion in derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed.' 7 Addi-
tionally, the drafters of the Act, intending to encourage the use of limited
partnerships as an alternative business form, removed the imposition of
unlimited liability on a limited partner as a result of inconsequential de-
partures from the statutory provisions." The Act instead specifically re-
8. ULPA § 1, Official Comment; Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1917). For a discussion of the earlier forms of limited partnerships, see
Ames v. Downing, I Bradf. 321 (N.Y. 1850).
9. ULPA § 1, Official Comment.
10. See 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 2, § 39.03(I).
11. ULPA § 1, Official Comment.
12. See Holliday v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 3 Colo. 342 (1877); Pierce v. Bryant, 87
Mass. 91 (1862); Maloney v. Bruce, 94 Pa. 249 (1880); ULPA § I, Official Comment; 48
MICH. L. REV. 347, 348 (1950).
13. Basye, supra note 6, at 37. See Haggerty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17 (1869).
14. 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 2, § 39.03(I); Note, supra note 6, at 1016; seeln re Allen's
Estate, 41 Minn. 430, 43 N.W. 382 (1889); Spencer Optical Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 53 S.C. 533,
31 S.E. 392 (1898).
15. Basye, supra note 6, at 37; Note, supra note 6, at 1017.
16. Henningsen v. Barnard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 255 P.2d 837, 841 (1953); Stowe v.
Merrilees, 6 Cal. App. 2d 217, 44 P.2d 368 (1935); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218
P.2d 757 (1950); Brown, The Limited Partnership in Indiana, 5 IND. L.J. 421, 423 (1930); 45
YALE L.J. 895, 899 (1936).
17. ULPA § 28(I).
18. Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S. 553, 562-63 (1924); Plasteel Prod. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d
354, 356 (1st Cir. 1959); 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 2, § 39.03(2)(a). An important figure in
the drafting of the ULPA commented:
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quires that there be substantial good faith compliance with the statutory
requirements; 19 as a result, mere technical defects will no longer cause a
limited partner to incur general partner liability.2"
The ULPA defines a limited partnership as a partnership formed by two
or more persons having at least one or more general partners and one or
more limited partners.2' The decision to structure limited partnerships in
this manner may well have been a compromise between two conflicting
policy arguments: on the one hand, creditors and third parties dealing
with the partnership should be able to expect repayment of money loaned
to the partnership or to have contracts performed by the partnership; par-
ties in the partnership, however, should be able to agree to limit their lia-
bility to no more than the amount they have invested.22 The conflict was
resolved by requiring the presence of at least one partner with unlimited
personal liability for partnership obligations, who had control over the in-
vestments of those partners whose liability was limited.23 As the general
partner is endowed with all the rights, powers, and liabilities of a partner
in a normal partnership,24 management and control of the business is
vested in his hands.2 5 Regardless of the amount of his capital contribu-
tion, the general partner can be held personally liable for the debts and
obligations of the partnership.26 By requiring at least one general partner,
the Act attempts to insure the existence of one party in the partnership
with unlimited liability.2
7
In contrast, the limited partner is granted only limited rights under the
Practically all the differences between the new Uniform Act and the existing
statutes are due to the desire of the Conference to present to the legislatures of
the several states an act, under which a person willing to invest his money in a
business for a share in the profits, may become a limited partner, with the
same sense of security from any possibility of unlimited liability as the sub-
scribers to the shares of a corporation.
Lewis, supra note 8, at 723.
19. Tiburon Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 263 Cal. App. 2d 868, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837 (1968);
Henningsen v. Barnard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 255 P.2d 837, 841 (1953); ULPA § 2(2).
20. Basye, supra note 6, at 37.
21. ULPA § 1. A limited partnership formed under the Act is permitted to carry on any
business that a general partnership can carry on, subject to any state-imposed restrictions.
ULPA § 3. Just less than half of the states do not permit limited partnerships to engage in
banking and insurance. The remaining states have no restrictions whatsoever. As of this
writing, 49 states, plus the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, have adopted ver-
sions of the ULPA. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 93 (Supp. 1979).
22. Coleman & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnershpp Planning, 30 Sw.
L.J. 887, 897 (1976). The authors of this article state that in finding a resolution to the
above-mentioned conflict, the drafters disregarded one other important policy consideration:
investor supervision of his investment. Id. at 897-98.
23. Id.
24. Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 8 Ariz. App. 424, 446 P.2d 934, 936 (1968); Cummings
v. Nordmark, 73 Wash. 2d 322, 438 P.2d 605, 606 (1968); ULPA § 9.
25. Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 8 Ariz. App. 424, 446 P.2d 934, 936 (1968); Merrick v.
New York Subways Advertising Co., 14 Misc. 2d 456, 178 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1958); 2 Z.
CAVITCH, supra note 2, § 39.07(1); Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnershp, 7 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 416, 418 (1974).




ULPA to participate in the affairs of the business. 2' The Act specifically
permits the limited partner to: (1) have the partnership books kept at the
principal place of business and to inspect and copy them at all times;
(2) demand information of all things affecting the partnership and an ac-
counting of partnership affairs when just and reasonable; (3) seek a judi-
cial dissolution and winding up of the partnership; and (4) share in the
profits and other compensation earned by the business, as well as a return
of his contribution. 29 In addition, the limited partner may make loans to
3 °
and assign his interest in " the limited partnership. Section 9 of the ULPA
sets out activities in which a general partner may not engage without the
approval or ratification of the limited partners.32 The Act also provides
that no limited partner's contribution can be returned nor his liabilities to
the partnership waived until permission of all members in the partnership
is given, including that of the limited partners.33 Consent must also be
gained before the remaining general partners may continue the business of
the partnership upon the retirement, death, or insanity of a general part-
ner. 
34
As the limited partnership is structured under the Act, the most impor-
tant difference between a limited partner and a general partner is the limi-
tation of liability of the limited partner to the amount of his contribution
to the partnership.35 This right to limited liability under the ULPA is con-
28. Feld, The "Control" Testfor Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472
(1969).
29. ULPA § 10.
30. Id. § 13.
31. Id. § 19.
32. Id. § 9 provides that a general partner has authority to do the following acts only
upon the written consent or ratification by the limited partners:
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the partnership,
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific property,
for other than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so to do is given in
the certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement
or insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is given in the
certificate.
33. Id. § 16(l)(b).
34. Id. § 20.
35. Id. § 1. Limited liability, however, is not the only desirable characteristic of the
limited partnership form. Until recently the limited partnership form provided the opportu-
nity for substantial tax savings over the corporate form of investment vehicle, and, in many
cases, still does so. If properly structured, a limited partnership will qualify for treatment as
a partnership rather than a corporation for federal income tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2 (1960). Consequently, the partners of the limited partnership, like those of a
general partnership, are taxable on their distributive share of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit. I.R.C. § 702. Partners may offset partnership losses, passing through
the partnership to them, against income from other sources for determination of their fed-
eral tax liability. The attractiveness of this "tax shelter" characteristic was further enhanced
by the increase in a partner's taxable basis in his partnership interest by his allocable share
of nonrecourse indebtedness of the partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). In
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ditional, however, and may be lost in several ways. For instance, if a lim-
ited partner's name appears in the partnership's name, he becomes liable
as a general partner to those creditors of the partnership who have ex-
tended credit to the partnership without actual knowledge that he is not a
general partner. 36 The limited partner may also become liable to any
party who relies to his detriment upon any false statement contained in the
partnership certificate, if the limited partner was aware of the falsity at the
time the certificate was signed by all the partners, or if it subsequently
became known to him within a sufficient time for him to cancel or amend
the certificate. 37 Finally, a limited partner loses his limited liability pursu-
ant to section 7 of the Act if "in addition to the exercise of his rights and
powers . . . he takes part in the control of the business. 38
Section 7, while easily stated, has not been susceptible to easy interpreta-
tion. This is due in large part to what appears to be an inability to deter-
mine the purpose of section 7. In one respect, it can be said that section 7
attempts on grounds of public policy to match partnership involvement
with liability. As one writer has stated: "[plublic policy is violated when a
partner retains his privileged status of limited liability while possessing the
ability to 'control.' "" On the other hand, there is the idea that section 7
was designed to protect those who deal with the partnership; if section 7
was intended to protect the reasonable expectations of creditors, it only
should be applied in situations in which a creditor has relied on acts of
control in dealings with the limited partnership.4" Added to this confusion
is the further fact that the comment to section 1 of the ULPA indicates that
effect, this allowed the partner to deduct amounts in excess of his actual economic invest-
ment in the partnership. The Tax Reform Act of 1978, however, extends the at-risk rules of
I.R.C. § 465 to all activities other than real estate and equipment leasing by a closely-held
corporation. Section 465 limits the amount of a taxpayer's loss deductions to the amount
that the taxpayer has at risk and could actually lose in the activity undertaken. Thus, a
limited partner would be precluded from flow-through of losses to the extent of the nonre-
course liabilities of the partnership. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2). This restriction on the flow-through
of losses will inhibit the use of limited partnerships as an investment vehicle except in the
two areas where § 465 does not apply. Despite the above, the limited partnership still pro-
vides one possible advantage over a corporate entity: the avoidance of double taxation.
Generally, income earned by a corporation is taxed twice-once at the corporate level and
again when received in the form of dividends by a shareholder. As noted above, income
earned by a limited partnership is taxed only once-at the partner level. See Hurd &
Mayer, Ohio Limited Partnerships-Business Use and Effect, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 373, 391
(1966).
36. ULPA § 5.
37. Id. § 6. Unlike a general partnership, which can be formed by a mere informal
agreement, a limited partnership can only be validly created by complying with certain stat-
utory requirements. Id. § 2 stipulates that persons desiring to form a limited partnership
must sign a certificate setting forth among other things: (1) the name, character, location,
and duration of the business; (2) names and addresses of both the general and limited
partners; (3) the contributions of the limited partners and their share of the profits; and
(4) provisions for the substitution of other partners and the continuance of the business. In
addition, the certificate must be filed with an office designated by the state.
38. Id.§7.
39. Note, Liability of Limited Partners Participating in the Management of the Sole Cor-
porate General Partner-Delaney v. Fidelity Ltd., 29 Sw. L.J. 791, 796 (1975).
40. Feldman, The Limited Partner's Participation in the Control of the Partnership
Business, 50 CONN. B.J. 168, 173-74 (1976).
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a limited partner under the ULPA should be able to exercise "some degree
of control over the conduct of the business."'" Thus, in spite of the fact
that limited partnerships are intended to be viable business alternatives,
much of the effect of the ULPA is lost because of the uncertainty of the
application of section 7 and the definition of control.
C. Case Law Construing Section 7
The case law construing section 7 has failed to provide a clear, definite
interpretation of what constitutes control. This failure stems from two fac-
tors. First, there has been a relatively small amount of litigation in this
area, which several commentators attribute to a cautious attitude amongst
lawyers in advising limited partners as to the extent of permissible partici-
pation in a partnership.42 Secondly, in dealing with such problems when
they do arise most courts have approached each situation on an ad hoc
basis and thereby have avoided enunciating any general guiding principles
applicable to other situations.43 Analysis of the relevant case law reveals
the evolution of two variant tests for purposes of ascertaining violations of
statutes modeled after section 7: the "power" or "control" test and the
"reliance" test."
The Power Test. The "power" or "control" test involves a quantitative
analysis by the court of the powers exercised by a limited partner in the
affairs of the partnership.45 Normally, if the limited partners have the
power to "initiate matters and to decide them entirely within the group of
limited partners," control within section 7 is present. 6 One of the earliest
and foremost cases decided clearly under the power test approach is Holz-
man v. De Escamilla.4 7 In Holzman the limited partnership was involved
in a farming operation. Testimony indicated that the two limited partners
had visited the farm on a regular basis, and had not only conferred with
the general partner as to what crops should be grown, but also on several
occasions had overruled the general partner's choice. The general partner
was ultimately required to resign and the limited partners selected a suc-
cessor. Of particular importance to the court was the fact that the limited
partners had ultimate power over the disposition of partnership funds, as
both could write checks on the firm's bank account without the knowledge
or consent of the general partner. In addition, the general partner had no
authority to withdraw funds without first obtaining the countersignature of
one of the limited partners.48 Together, these factors led the court to con-
41. ULPA § 1, Official Comment.
42. See Feld, supra note 28, at 1484; Feldman, supra note 40, at 213.
43. See Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371, 375 (1974); 2 Z.
CAVITCH, supra note 2, § 39.07(2)(c)(i).
44. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 899.
45. Note, Foreign Limited Partnershps.• A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform Limited
Partnershop Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1174, 1193 (1974).
46. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 899.
47. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
48. 195 P.2d at 834. The court stated: "Either Russell or Andrews [the limited partners]
1306 [Vol. 32
COMMENTS
clude that the limited partners had, contrary to the statute, participated in
the control of the business.49
In Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corp. of America5° a limited partnership
was formed and caused the organization of a life insurance company. The
limited partners acted as the officers and directors of the insurance com-
pany. A shareholder of the insurance company brought a derivative action
alleging that the company issued stock to the directors, at their own behest,
in return for which the company received nothing of value. In response to
this contention, the officers and directors claimed a limitation on their lia-
bility based on their status as limited partners.5 While not examining the
activities of the limited partners in detail, the court stated that since the
only business of the partnership was the operation of the company, the
limited partners by their activities in the company as officers and directors
had participated in the control of the partnership business.52
In Plasteel Products v. Heiman53 an allegation was made by a creditor
that since the limited partners possessed and had exercised the right to pick
the general sales manager, they had control over the partnership steel busi-
ness. In addition, the partnership agreement provided that the general
partner was allowed to make certain financial decisions only in conjunc-
tion with the general sales manager.5 4 An analysis of the limited partners'
powers resulted in no imposition of unlimited liability. The court stressed
the fact that the general partner possessed the discretionary authority to
discharge the general manager at any time. Based on this factor, the court
concluded that the limited partners did not possess control within the
meaning of the statute.55
While the above cases differ factually, the common thread running
through all the decisions appears to be an attempt to determine who has
the ultimate control over the ongoing operations of the partnership. If a
limited partner actually performs the normal activities associated with
ongoing management or has sufficient power to control the day-to-day
functions of the business, he will be found liable as a general partner. In
Holzman, since the limited partners had authority over the finances of the
partnership, the general partner could not have the final say as to the regu-
lar conduct of business. On the other hand, in Plasteel the general partner
possessed the authority to terminate any apparent control the limited part-
could take control of the business from de Escamilla by refusing to sign checks for bills
contracted by him and thus limit his activities in the management of the business." Id.
49. Id.
50. 170 F. Supp. 150 (C.D. Utah 1958), rev'don other grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959).
51. 170 F. Supp. at 158.
52. Id. at 159. The actual basis for denying the limited liability was that in fact the
limited partnership had not been formed since there was a lack of substantial compliance
with the partnership statute. Citing Holzman, the court stated that even had there been
substantial compliance, it would have ruled against the limited partners on the control fac-
tor. Id. at 158-59.
53. 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).




ners may have had by firing the general sales manager who was appointed
by the limited partners. Interestingly, none of the courts in the above deci-
sions discussed whether the third parties involved relied on or were even
aware of the various activities in question prior to filing suit. Under the
power approach, therefore, there need be no actual showing of harmful or
detrimental reliance. All that is required in order to impose general part-
ner liability is to show "control" on the part of the limited partner. 6
The Reliance Test. The reliance test, in contrast to the power test, empha-
sizes whether the activities of a limited partner would reasonably lead
a third party to believe that the limited partner has the liability of a gen-
eral partner.5 ' Thus, the reliance approach focuses not on the powers per-
mitted or exerted by a limited partner, but rather on the activities of the
limited partner and whether a third party has been led to the mistaken
assumption that a limited partner has general liability for partnership obli-
gations. The notion that a third party must have reasonably relied on
some activity of a limited partner before liability will be imposed was first
put forth in Rathke v. Griffith." In Rathke the defendant limited partner
had been selected to the board of directors of the firm that was to conduct
the affairs of the partnership. Additionally, his name appeared as a "co-
partner" in the granting clauses of two warranty deeds, and he had signed
several instruments along with the general partners without specifying his
status as a limited partner. 59 The court refused to impose liability, stating:
We call attention once more to the fact that it is not alleged that re-
spondent ever relied on Mr. Griffith's [the limited partner] position as
a general partner, or in fact ever understood that Mr. Griffith was
anything other than a limited partner. Under these circumstances, we
see no reason for holding Mr. Griffith liable to respondent as a gen-
eral partner.6 °
In JC. Wattenbarger & Sons v. Sanders6' an attempt was made to im-
pose personal liability on a limited partner because, in the publishing of a
notice that the partnership was operating under a fictitious name, he had
allegedly held himself out to the world to be a general partner.62 The
court, however, held that because the certificate had not come to the re-
spondent's attention until after the transaction in question was almost
completed, the limited partner retained his limited liability.63
Use of the reliance test was also evident in the case of Silvola v.
56. As a consequence, the power test approach has been criticized as unfairly giving a
creditor of the limited partnership a "windfall" since he need not even demonstrate that he
had a reasonable expectation that the limited partner was liable to him. See Feldman, supra
note 40, at 179-82.
57. Feld, supra note 28, at 1479; Note, supra note 45, at 1195.
58. 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
59. 218 P.2d at 764.
60. Id.
61. 216 Cal. App. 2d 495, 30 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1963).
62. 30 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
63. Id. at 914. The court stated: "The question to be answered when it is contended
that a defendant is an ostensible partner is whether the acts and conduct of an individual
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Rowlett,6 4 which involved a contention that a limited partner was liable as
a general partner since he had worked in the partnership business. The
court noted that the plaintiff, as the partnership's accountant, was aware of
the limited partner's status at all times and therefore could not have been
reasonably led to believe that the limited partner had unlimited liability.65
Finally, in Filesi v. United States66 the court assessed a limited partner
general partner liability for a federal excise tax, noting that the limited
partner "openly and publicly took an active role in the management and
control of the business."6 7 The implication was that the limited partner's
behavior would lead others to a reasonable belief that the limited partner
was a general partner.6"
The reliance test decisions as a whole seem to reflect a judicial determi-
nation that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on a limited partner for
performing certain acts of "control" absent a showing that the plaintiff has
suffered a detriment as a result.69 In effect, they represent a judgment that
acts of control on the part of a limited partner are not inherently contrary
to public policy. Rather, such acts only become objectionable if some in-
nocent third party is injured as a consequence.
Choice of Tests:" Delaney and Frigidaire. Support for both the power ap-
proach and the reliance approach can be garnered from the ULPA. It can
be argued that had the drafters of the Act intended that reliance be present
in order for liability to be imposed, they would have expressly mentioned
it in section 7. This is especially relevant since under section 6 of the Act,
reliance was specifically mentioned before the limited partner could incur
the liability of a general partner.70 The official comment of the ULPA,
however, states that there is no justification for imposing unlimited liabil-
ity on a limited partner as long as "creditors have no reason to believe at
the times their credits were extended that such person was so bound."'"
This statement implies that a reliance factor is necessary in order to show
control.72
The question of which test should apply was directly considered in two
were factually and legally sufficient to lead another person to believe he was a copartner and
assumed responsibility as such." Id.
64. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
65. 272 P.2d at 289.
66. 352 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1965).
67. Id.
68. The decision in Filesi differs somewhat from the other decisions mentioned under
the "reliance" test. Though not explicitly stated, the other cases would seem to require that
there be actual reliance on the part of the plaintiff before liability will be imposed. In Fiesi,
however, the court did not say whether there had been any such reliance on the part of the
Government. It simply intimated that the acts would be sufficient to cause such reliance.
69. The reliance approach can perhaps be viewed as accepting the notion that allowing
a plaintiff to treat a limited partner as a general partner where the plaintiff was not misled by
any of the limited partner's acts is an unfair windfall. See note 56 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
71. ULPA § 1, Official Comment.
72. Most commentators on the subject have supported the reliance approach. See Feld-
man, supra note 40, at 182; Feld, supra note 28, at 1479.
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recent and factually similar cases, Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Limited73 and
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc.7 ' Both cases involved a
limited partnership with a corporation as the sole qeneral partner. In ad-
dition, several of the limited partners held stock in and served as officers
and directors of the corporate general partners. The plaintiffs alleged that
because of their positions in the corporations the limited partners were
exercising control over the partnership business and therefore should have
unlimited liability for its obligations. In resolving this issue, however, the
two courts reached different conclusions.
In Delaney the Texas Supreme Court overruled a lower court holding"
and held that the limited partners would lose their limited liability upon a
showing that the limited partners exercised control over the general part-
ner. The court expressly held that for the purpose of imposing personal
liability upon a limited partner, a demonstration of reliance on the part of
a third party is unnecessary.76 This result was reached by a strict interpre-
tation of the Texas counterpart of section 7.77 The court reasoned that
since no mention was made of reliance in the statutory provisions, 78 there
was no need for proof as to its existence in order to impose liability.79
73. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
74. 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
75. 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), rep'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975),
noted in 7 TEX. TECH L. REV. 745 (1976). The civil appeals court in El Paso had adopted
the reliance test: "The logical reason to hold a limited partner to general liability under the
control prohibition of the Statute is to prevent third parties from mistakenly assuming that
the limited partner is a general partner and to rely on his general liability." 517 S.W.2d at
425.
76. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
77. Note, supra note 39, at 795.
78. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon 1970).
79. In its opinion, the court also expressed concern that the statutory requirement of
having at least one general partner with unlimited liability for partnership obligations would
be circumvented by allowing the limited partners to operate the partnership through a cor-
poration that was only minimally capitalized. 526 S.W.2d at 546; see note 27 supra and
accompanying text. In effect, the court was fearful that sanctioning the use of corporations
as general partners would result in the abuse of the rights of creditors dealing with limited
partnerships. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 901. Also implicit in the decision is
the idea that it is contrary to public policy for a limited partner to retain his special liability
status while at the same time exercising control over partnership affairs. Note, supra note
39, at 796.
The opinion is subject to criticism in several respects. First, the plaintiff in Delaney knew
that it was dealing with a corporation functioning in the capacity of general partner. Assum-
ing that it was aware of the limited liability nature of such a business entity, the plaintiff, if
truly concerned about the ability of the corporation to meet its financial obligations, could
have sought personal guarantees from those limited partners serving in the corporation.
Since the plaintiff did not, it is hard to understand why it should be able to collect from the
limited partners on the ground that the limited partners were exercising control over the
partnership. Secondly, for all of its discussion on the evils of allowing a minimally-capital-
ized corporation to serve as a general partner, the court made no inquiry on whether the
corporate general partner in Delaney was undercapitalized. If the corporation was not, it is
difficult to envision how the plaintiffs rights against the limited partnership were hampered
in any way. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 902. Finally, singling out the use
of a corporation in the capacity as a general partner as a means of defrauding creditors
dealing with a limited partnership seems unreasonable. From a practical standpoint, it is
just as likely that a limited partnership could be formed with an individual who possesses
little or no assets serving as general partner.
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Conversely, in Frigidaire the Supreme Court of Washington refused to
find personal liability on the part of the limited partners since no element
of reliance was present.8" Unlike the court in Delaney, the Frigidaire court
The Delaney case has recently helped spark considerable controversy in Texas. In its
opinion, the El Paso court of civil appeals said that it was permissible in Texas to form a
limited partnership with a corporation as its sole general partner. With regard to this state-
ment, the Texas Supreme Court commented:
The court had no point of error before it requiring such statement to be
made. Its accuracy depends upon the scope of the corporate charter, Luling
Oil& Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191 S.W.2d 716
(1945), and upon whether we should extend our holding in Port Arthur Trust
Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956), to sanction corporations
acting as general partners in a statutory limited partnership. We reserve any
decision on these questions until they are properly presented for our determi-
nation.
526 S.W.2d at 546.
On Aug. 16, 1978, the Attorney General of Texas issued an opinion, in large part based on
a substantial portion of the above-quoted language, which stated that a corporation could
not serve as the sole general partner in a limited partnership. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-
1229 (1978). In explaining the rationale for this conclusion, the opinion cited to all of the
above-quoted language from Delaney, except for the last sentence in that passage. More-
over, the opinion went on to state: "On the basis of the court's language in Delaney, we do
not believe that a corporation may, in Texas at this time, serve as the sole general partner of
a limited partnership."
The soundness of the opinion is suspect for several reasons. First, at most the supreme
court's language in Delaney, relied on by the attorney general to such a great extent, was a
mere dictum. It clearly was not germane to the central holding in the case, which related to
the potential liability of the limited partners to the plaintiff-creditor. To accord the language
such weight seems questionable. Secondly, the statement can hardly be said to represent an
affirmative indication of the court's position on the matter. This is particularly true in light
of the language of the court that was not included in the attorney general's opinion: "We
reserve any decision on these questions until they are properly presented for our determina-
tion." Thirdly, the conclusion reached is clearly contrary to statutory law in Texas. Since
1973, pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation Act, corporations in the state have been
specifically empowered "[t]o be ... partners. . . of any partnership, joint venture, or other
enterprise." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(18) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). In addi-
tion, the Texas Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b, § 6(1) (Vernon 1970) (emphasis added). "Person" is defined in the same Act as
including "individual, partnerships, corporations, and other associations." TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 2 (Vernon 1970) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a limited part-
nership is defined in part as "a partnership formed by two (2) or more persons ... and
having as members one (1) or more general partners and one (1) or more limited partners."
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 2 (Vernon 1970) (emphasis added). Moreover, it is
provided that the Texas Uniform Partnership Act is to apply to limited partnerships in this
state except to the extent inconsistent with the limited partnership act. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132 b, § 6(2) (Vernon 1970). Based on the above, there is a strong statutory
argument that corporations can in fact serve as general partners in a limited partnership.
See Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz & Winship, Corporate General Partners 16
TEX. ST. B. BULL. SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., No. I, Sept. 1978, at 24; Hamilton,
Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 153 (1976).
On Aug. 23, 1978, the portion of H-1229 relating to the authority of a corporation to be
the sole general partner in a limited partnership was withdrawn pending consideration.
TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1229a (1978).
80. The Frigidaire court attempted to distinguish the Delaney decision from the action
before it. First, the court noted that in Delaney the corporate general partner and the limited
partnership were formed at the same time, the purpose of the corporation being to operate
the limited partnership. The acts of the corporation, therefore, were to benefit the partner-
ship rather than to further the aims of the corporation itself. Conversely, in Frigidaire the
corporation was involved in investigating real estate investment opportunities; when such
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refused to restrict itself to a literal interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage.8' The court acknowledged that the limited partners in their corpo-
rate capacities exercised day-to-day control and management of the
limited partnership.82 Yet, it noted that the third party creditor involved
was aware that he was dealing with a corporate general partner and did
not rely on the limited partners' control of the corporate general partner by
assuming that the limited partners were in fact general partners. 83
D. Problems Caused by Lack of a Clear Standard
The absence of a clear definition of control has created several
problems. Most obviously, it has led to varying interpretations of control,
which, in turn, have resulted in inconsistent holdings in factually similar
cases, 84 contrary to the express purpose of the ULPA to make uniform the
laws of states adopting the Act.85 Additionally, such an inconsistency
makes it extremely difficult for an attorney to know, either in structuring a
limited partnership or in advising an existing one, how much power can be
exercised by a limited partner. 86 As indicated by the decision in Frigidaire,
in jurisdictions employing a reliance test a limited partner could assume a
opportunities were discovered, limited partnerships were then formed with the corporation
as general partner. Thus, the court reasoned that, unlike in Delaney, the acts of the corpo-
rate entity were not solely for the benefit of the limited partnership. 562 P.2d at 246. Sec-
ondly, the court noted the Texas Supreme Court's indecision over the propriety of allowing
a corporation even to function as a sole general partner. Id. The Washington court earlier
in its opinion had acknowledged that it was permissible under Washington law for a corpo-
ration to serve in such a capacity. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 247. For purposes of clarification, it should be noted that at present Washing-
ton is among a small number of states that have adopted a definition of control that varies
from that contained in § 7. See note 90 infra. At the time of this action, however, limited
partnerships in that state were operating under a provision, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 25.08.070 (1969), identical to the ULPA version.
82. 562 P.2d at 245.
83. The court stated:
[B]ecause respondents scrupulously separated their actions on behalf of the
corporation from their personal actions, petitioner never mistakenly assumed
that respondents were general partners with general liability. . . .Petitioner
knew Union Properties [the corporation in question] was the sole general part-
ner and did not rely on respondents' control by assuming that they were also
general partners.
Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
The Frigidaire court also failed to share in the Delaney court's concern over the potential
for abuse of creditors' rights by the formation of limited partnerships containing a corpora-
tion as sole general partner. Id. at 246; see note 79 supra. It stated that any time a creditor
deals with a corporation it faces the risk that the corporation will lack sufficient funds to
meet its obligations. Id. at 246. The court reasoned that if the creditor in Frigidaire was
truly concerned about the solvency of the corporate general partner, it could have sought
personal guarantees from the defendant limited partners. Id. at 247. Moreover, the court
indicated that the fact a corporate general partner may be inadequately capitalized is not in
and of itself justification for imposing unlimited liability on the limited partners because of
their control of the corporation. Id. at 246. Rather, the court said that the rights of creditors
in such a situation can be protected pursuant to the corporate law doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil." Id. at 247.
84. See notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text.
85. See ULPA § 28(2).
86. Two commentators state with regard to this point: "Probably the most serious prob-
lem encountered in drafting and carrying out a limited partnership agreement is that of
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much more expansive role in the business, while in jurisdictions using a
power test the limited partner's participation in the business is restricted.
Thus, in jurisdictions that have yet to decide how the control problem will
be handled, advising attorneys are faced with a considerable dilemma.
The resulting uncertainty over the permissible level of control may actu-
ally discourage the use of limited partnerships as investment vehicles.8 7 At
the very least, those who do become limited partners may be so overly
cautious in their actions that they fail to retain adequate supervision over
their investment. The uncertainty also presents problems for those limited
partnerships transacting business in more than one state."8 Conflicting
holdings such as Delaney and Frigidaire illustrate that activities permissi-
ble in one jurisdiction may not be permissible in another, creating
problems not only in planning, but also in the area of conflict of laws
should litigation arise.89 Finally, the situation is further aggravated by
states that have recognized the existing deficiencies in the ULPA's stan-
dard of control and have altered their statutes in an attempt to clarify the
extent to which a limited partner may participate.9 ° While their desire to
determining what constitutes taking part 'in the control of the business' of a limited partner-
ship." Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 897.
87. This too is contrary to the intention of the drafters of the ULPA. See note 18 supra
and accompanying text.
88. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 22, at 904-06; Note, supra note 45, at 1192-
97.
89. See Note, supra note 45, at 1200-07.
90. Eight states at the present time have enacted legislation that varies from § 7. Five of
these states have passed laws specifically granting the right of limited partners to vote on
certain matters affecting the partnership. For example, NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.080 (1973)provides: i1. A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business.
2. A limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the
business by virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the cer-
tificate, to vote upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership,
including the following matters or others of a similar nature:
(a) Election or removal of general partners.
(b) Termination of partnership.
(c) Amendment of the partnership agreement.
(d) Sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership.
3. The statement of powers set forth in subsection 2 is not exclusive and
does not indicate that any other powers possessed or exercised by a limited
partner are sufficient to cause such limited partner to be deemed to take part
in the control of the business within the meaning of subsection 1.
Other state statutes specifically granting voting privileges include: CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 15507 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707 (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 69.280
(1975); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1977).
Alabama and Delaware, on the other hand, have adopted a test based on reliance. For
example, ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 10-9-41 (1977), provides:
A limited partner may from time to time examine into the state and progress
of the partnership business, advise as to its management and act as attorney-
at-law, but he must not act as agent for the partnership for any purpose; and if
he acts contrary to this subsection, he is liable as a general partner to any
partnership creditor who extends credit to the partnership in the good faith
belief that he was dealing with a general partner.
Nebraska is the final state at present with a section that differs from § 7. NEB. REV. STAT.
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provide a more workable standard is understandable, the effect is to de-
crease even more the uniformity amongst the states and exacerbate the
conflict of laws problem. 9'
II. SECTION 303 OF THE REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT
Section 30392 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act sets out a
new standard for determining whether unauthorized control has been ex-
§ 67-210(3) (1976) provides that when a limited partnership qualifies as an investment com-
pany within the terms of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the limited partners shall
have the right to vote: (i) to elect directors or trustees of the investment company; (2) to
approve or terminate investment advisory or underwriting contracts; (3) to approve audi-
tors; and (4) to approve any matters that the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires to
be considered by the holders of beneficial interests in the investment company.
91. There has also been considerable concern among those dealing with limited part-
nerships in states that allow limited partners to vote on matters affecting the partnership's
business that the possession and exercise of these voting rights by the limited partners may
render them liable in states that have yet to permit such voting. See generally Augustine,
Fass, Lester & Robinson, The Liability of Limited Partners Having Certain Statutory Voting
Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Partnership, 31 Bus. LAW. 2087 (1976); Comment,
Partnership.- Can Rights Required to be Given under New Tax Shelter Investment Regulations
be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act?, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 289
(1973).
92. RULPA § 303 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for
the obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or,
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business. However, if the limited partner's
participation in the control of the business is not substantially the same as the
exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of his
participation in control.
(b) A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business
within the meaning of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the fol-
lowing:
(1) being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partner-
ship or of a general partner;
(2) consulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the busi-
ness of the limited partnership;
(3) acting as surety for the limited partnership;
(4) approving or disapproving an amendment to the partnership agree-
ment; or
(5) voting on one or more of the following matters:
(i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
(ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of
all or substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership
other than in the ordinary course of its business;
(iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other
than in the ordinary course of its business;
(iv) a change in the nature of the business; or
(v) the removal of a general partner.
(c) The enumeration in subsection (b) does not mean that the possession
or exercise of any other powers by a limited partner constitutes participation
by him in the business of the limited partnership.
(d) A limited partner who knowingly permits his name to be used in the
name of the limited partnership, except under circumstances permitted by Sec-
tion 102(2)(i), is liable to creditors who extend credit to the limited partnership
without actual knowledge that the limited partner is not a general partner.
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ercised.93 It also provides certain "safe harbor" activities in which the lim-
ited partner may engage without fear of incurring unlimited liability, such
as allowing limited partners the right to vote on specified matters related to
the affairs of the partnership.94 Section 303 additionally modifies the lia-
bility of a limited partner in a situation in which his name appears in the
name of the limited partnership by requiring that the limited partner must
have knowingly permitted such a use of his name.95
A. Liability Under Section 303(a)
Section 303(a) begins with essentially the same language as was used in
section 7 of the ULPA. 96 Under this subsection, however, a limited part-
ner may incur unlimited liability in two ways: first, when his participation
in control of the partnership is substantially the same as that of a general
partner, and second, when his participation in the control of the partner-
ship is not substantially the same as that of a general partner, 97 but the
party dealing with the business has actual knowledge of such participa-
tion.98 If a limited partner's participation in the control of the corporation
is substantially the same as that of a general partner, liability may be fixed
regardless of whether the third party relied on or knew of the participa-
tion.99 This approach should resemble in its operation the power test; a
challenge under this part of section 303(a) will involve an examination on
93. The revised Act also makes other additions and changes in the prior uniform law.
Without attempting to provide an exhaustive list, some of the modifications are as follows:
(1) article 9 provides for the regulation and registration of foreign limited partnerships;
(2) article 10 gives a limited partner the right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the
limited partnership; (3) sections 101 and 501 provide that a limited partner's contribution
may take the form of services; (4) section 103 permits the right by registration to an exclu-
sive use of a limited partnership name; and (5) section 503 stipulates that profits and losses
will be allocated among the partners on the basis of the value of their contributions as stated
in the limited partnership certificate, unless otherwise provided in the partnership agree-
ment. Section 504 is a similar provision relating to the distribution of partnership cash or
other assets. See Gregory, The Financial Provisions of the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act: Articles 5 and 6, Symposium.- Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 479
(1978); Reuschlein, Limited Partnership Derivative Suits, Symposium.- Limited Partnership
Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 443 (1978); Sell, An Examination ofArticles 3, 4 and 9 of the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Symposium.- Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J.
459 (1978).
94. In allowing voting privileges, the revised Act is following the example of several
states that already provide for them. See note 90 supra.
95. RULPA § 303(d); see note 36 supra and accompanying text.
96. Section 7 was incorporated by the drafters in order to guarantee that court decisions
made under the earlier act remain applicable to the extent not expressly modified by the new
version. RULPA § 303, Commissioners' Comment.
97. The approach selected by the drafters based on whether a limited partner's partici-
pation is "substantially the same as" or "not substantially the same as" is entirely different
from any used by the small groups of states that have already modified § 7 of the ULPA.
See note 90 supra.
98. RULPA § 303(a).
99. The Commissioners' Comment on this section states in part:
Because of the difficulty of determining when the 'control' line has been over-
stepped, it was thought it unfair to impose general partner's liability on a lim-
ited partner except to the extent that a third party had knowledge of his
participation in control of the business. On the other hand, in order to avoid
permitting a limited partner to exercise all of the powers of a general partner
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the part of the court of the various powers and activities of the limited
partner to determine whether his participation is substantially the same as
that of a general partner."° On the other hand, a limited partner may
incur liability beyond his contribution, even though his acts of control are
not substantially the same as that of a general partner, if some control is
exercised and a third party who transacts business with the limited part-
nership has actual knowledge of that participation in control.
Extent of Liability. Under section 7 of the ULPA, once "control" is found
to have been exercised by the limited partner, it is necessary to determine
the extent of the limited partner's liability. The initial issue is, since the
limited partner becomes liable "as a general partner," is he liable for all
past, present, and future obligations of the partnership, for those partner-
ship obligations that arose during the time of control and all obligations
arising thereafter, or only for those obligations that arose during the time
that the limited partner exercised control.' ° ' The second issue is, under a
reliance approach, if the limited partner becomes liable as a general part-
ner, is he so liable only to those creditors that relied on his participation or
is the reliance of one creditor sufficient to impose general liability as to all
creditors. Of these two issues, only the latter is clearly resolved by section
303.
Section 303 does not delineate the time span for which the limited part-
ner who has violated the section is liable. Although there is similar uncer-
tainty under section 7 of the ULPA, one commentator suggests that
liability under that section be determined according to the Uniform Part-
nership Act.'° 2 This is also the logical approach under section 303. If the
limited partner's participation is substantially the same as that of a general
partner, then presumably the limited partner is liable as a general partner
would be pursuant to the liability provisions of the Uniform Partnership
while avoiding any direct dealings with third parties, the 'is not substantially
the same as' test was introduced.
Id. While the wording of this part of the Commissioners' Comment is confusing, its appar-
ent thrust is that by introducing the "not substantially the same as" test, a section has been
added that requires knowledge as a prerequisite to liability; in all other situations, by direct
inference, no knowledge is required to impose liability. Thus, it is not necessary to prove
that the creditor was aware of the limited partner's participation when that participation is
substantially the same as that of a general partner.
The Commissioners' Comment also indicates that the first sentence of § 303(a) "carries
over the basic test [ofl former Section 7 . . . in order to insure that judicial decisions under
the prior uniform law remain applicable to the extent not expressly changed." Id. (emphasis
added). It can be persuasively argued that the language of § 303(a), particularly that per-
taining to "actual knowledge" in a "not substantially the same as" situation, "expressly"
makes inapplicable the case law establishing reliance as the determinative element of § 7 of
the ULPA.
Because a limited partner is held personally liable under the "substantially the same as"
test regardless of whether the creditor relies or has knowledge of his participation, there
exists a windfall element. This criticism, however, assumes that the purpose of § 303(a) is
the protection of third party creditors.
100. For a discussion of the power test, see notes 45-56 supra and accompanying text.
101. Feldman, supra note 40, at 174-75.
102. Id. at 175.
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Act. Thus, if a limited partner was in control from the inception of the
partnership, he would be jointly and severally liable for all partnership
obligations. Assuming the limited partner began participating at some
point after the partnership began, he would be liable only to the extent of
his contribution for prior partnership obligations, and would incur unlim-
ited liability for debts incurred thereafter. Similarly, in the case of a lim-
ited partner who exercises some control, but not substantially the same as
that of a general partner, the limitation of liability to those who transact
business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of the partici-
pation presumably excludes liability for obligations incurred prior to the
participation. Thus, the limited partner would only incur personal liability
to those persons with knowledge for obligations arising during the time of
participation and thereafter.
Another potential problem unaddressed by section 303 is whether the
limited partner's relinquishment of control would have any effect on the
extent of his liability. For example, in the case of a limited partner whose
participation in control is substantially that of a general partner, would
relinquishing that control avoid unlimited liability for partnership obliga-
tions incurred thereafter? Likewise, in the situation where a limited part-
ner participates in control, but not substantially the same as a general
partner, could the limited partner avoid further liability by giving actual
notice that he has relinquished participation in control to those creditors
with knowledge of his past participation? Both approaches are consistent
with the underlying policy bases and have been suggested in commentary
on section 7 of the ULPA 113 and section 303 of the RULPA.1°4
There is a potential interpretational problem under section 7 of the
ULPA in those jurisdictions applying the reliance test. Section 7 provides
that when a limited partner is found to be participating in the "control" of
the business, he is liable "as a general partner." This could be interpreted
as meaning that if one creditor relies on the participation of the limited
partner, that partner becomes personally liable not only to the relying
creditors, but to all partnership creditors. Such an interpretation is clearly
extreme if the policy basis underlying the reliance test is the protection of
the reasonable expectations of creditors.° 5 Furthermore, if this is truly a
problem under the ULPA, the case law does not reflect it. Nonetheless,
section 303 resolves any doubts in this regard by providing that the limited
partner's personal liability extends only to those persons with actual
knowledge of his participation.
Definition of Control. As for when a limited partner's participation in con-
trol is substantially the same as that of a general partner, the implication is
that the limited partner must be exercising power over the day-to-day op-
erations of the partnership; however, the use of the word "substantially"
103. Id. at 179.
104. Seli, supra note 93, at 464.
105. Id. at 463.
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also implies that the powers of a limited partner do not have to be identical
to those a general partner normally has. The clearest instance of when
participation will not be substantially the same as that of a general partner
would probably be when a limited partner engages only in an isolated act
of control over the partnership. Apart from situations in which a limited
partner's control is either absolute or an isolated, single event, it is difficult
to know how his participation will be categorized. Neither the revised Act
nor the Commissioners' Comment to section 303(a) provide any guidance
as to when a limited partner's participation crosses over the line from not
substantially the same to substantially the same as that of a general part-
ner. The distinction is an important one as it is determinative of whether
the element of knowledge of the participation in control by a third party
need be present, and consequently the extent of limited partner liability.
The Knowledge Test. As previously noted, in a situation where some con-
trol has been exercised by the limited partner, yet it is not substantially the
same as that of a general partner, it must be shown that the third party has
actual knowledge of the limited partner's participation in control before
unlimited liability can be imposed. The revised Act does not state whether
this information must be learned first hand by the third party or if the
knowledge requirement is satisfied simply by hearsay. The use of the word
actual would seem to imply, however, that a party transacting business
with the partnership must learn of the participation directly himself."°6
A more troublesome question in this context is whether in addition to
knowledge, the element of reliance on the part of the third party is neces-
sary. A strong argument can be advanced that the revised Act does not
require reliance. First, no specific mention of reliance is made in either the
statutory language or in the Commissioners' Comment to section 303. Re-
quiring that a third party have knowledge of a limited partner's participa-
tion in control does not necessarily mean that the person must also rely on
that participation. Second, in ight of the considerable confusion in recent
years over whether reliance is essential in order to impose general partner
liability, it would seem logical that had the drafters intended that reliance
be present, they would have clearly and unequivocally so stated. Finally,
an examination of the various drafts that this subsection went through
before completion indicates that reliance is not intended as a prerequisite
to imposition of unlimited liability. As originally drafted, the standard
adopted to replace section 7 was entirely based on reliance. 0 7 It was sub-
106. This interpretation is supported by language in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note
to the revised Act in which it is stated: "Moreover, [§ 303] goes on to confine the liability of
a limited partner who merely steps over the line of participation in control to persons who
actually know of that participation in control."
107. ULPA § 7 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1974) provided:
A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addi-
tion to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part
in the control of the business, and then only to persons who transact business




sequently dropped, however, and did not reappear in any of the later ver-
sions. Is The confusion on whether reliance is required is attributable to
language contained in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the revised
Act. The note states that with the exception of a situation where a limited
partner's participation in control is substantially the same as a general
partner, "the provisions of the new Act that impose liability on a limited
partner who has somehow permitted third parties to be misled to their
detriment as to the limited partner's true status confine that liability to
those who have actually been misled."' 0 9 Requiring that parties "be mis-
led to their detriment" seems far different from requiring that those parties
have only actual knowledge of a limited partner's control. Rather, use of
language such as "misled to their detriment" and "actually . . . misled"
suggests that reliance is a necessary factor. "'
B. Safe Harbor Provisions
Unlike section 7 of the ULPA, section 303(b) lists certain activities that a
limited partner may engage in without being deemed to have participated
in the control of the business."' Such activities include allowing him to
serve as a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership
or the general partner." 2 A limited partner may also consult with and give
advice to the general partner," 13 as well as function as a surety for the
partnership." 4 In addition, he may approve or disapprove of any amend-
ments to the partnership agreement1 5 and vote on matters affecting the
business as specified in the revised Act." 6 These voting rights for limited
partners, however, are not mandatory; rather, section 302 makes it clear
that the grant of such power is within the discretion of the partnership.' '
More importantly, if voting rights are granted, they cannot exceed those
108. Note that the significance of this particular point is suspect. The various drafts of
the revised Act contain a general disclaimer that any language in the drafts is not to be used
to construe the legislative meaning of the final version adopted.
109. RULPA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
110. If reliance is required, the end result is that the drafters have in effect combined the
control test and the reliance test for purposes of determining liability under section 303(a).
As discussed, the determination of whether a limited partner's activities in control are sub-
stantially the same as that of a general partner's will probably involve much the same kind
of analysis as that used under the power test, i e., an examination of the powers and activi-
ties of the limited partner. See notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text. If the limited
partner's participation in control is not substantially the same, the focus will then turn to
whether the activity was such as to mislead the third party with regard to the limited part-
ner's liability for partnership obligations.
I 11. RULPA § 303. The Commissioners' Comment to § 303 states: "Paragraph (b) is
intended to provide a 'safe harbor' by enumerating certain activities which a limited partner
may carry on for the partnership without being deemed to have taken part in control of the
business."
112. Id. § 303(b)(1).
113. Id. § 303(b)(2).
114. Id. § 303(b)(3).
115. Id. § 303(b)(4).
116. Id. § 303(b)(5).
117. RULPA § 302 provides: "Subject to section 303, the partnership agreement may
grant to all or a specified group of the limited partners the right to vote (on a per capita or
any other basis) upon any matter."
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specified in the safe harbor provisions of section 303(b)(5).'" 8 If they do,
the Commissioners' Comment to section 302 warns that "a court may hold
that . . . the limited partners have participated in 'control of the business'
within the meaning of Section 303(a)." 9
The list of safe harbor activities set forth in section 303(b) is not in-
tended to be an exhaustive one. Section 303(c) provides that the posses-
sion or exercise of any powers outside of those enumerated in subsection
(b) by a limited partner is not necessarily participation in the control of the
business.'12 Thus, subsection (c) in effect permits the limited partner even
greater latitude in performing partnership related activites.
It should be observed that even with the inclusion of the safe harbor
provisions in section 303(b), uncertainty about permissible levels of control
will still remain. An example will illustrate. Assume that under the terms
of a partnership agreement, approval of a limited partner is needed before
any purchases by the partnership above a specific dollar amount can be
made, and in accordance with this procedure such approval has been
given. The question arises as to whether the limited partner's participation
is sufficient to subject him to unlimited liability for partnership obliga-
tions. Clearly the activity is not one included in the safe harbor list; more-
over, it appears to be of a type that could be classified as participation in
the control of the business pursuant to section 303(a), resulting in the pos-
sibility of unlimited liability. This power, however, is somewhat analo-
gous to certain powers permitted under the safe harbor provisions.
Unlimited liability could therefore be avoided if it is demonstrated that the
activity is exempted by section 303(c). Thus, for many activities which are
outside of the safe harbor provisions, legal disputes seem likely in order to
determine whether the activities fall within either sections 303(a) or 303(c).
Although section 303(b) sets out certain activities in which a limited
partner can participate, it does not specify the extent of control over the
business that a limited partner may possess while engaged in any of the
activities. This is particularly relevant with regard to the limited partner
serving as an employee of the partnership or offering advice to the general
partner, since both activities could offer an opportunity for a limited part-
ner to exert considerable influence over partnership affairs. Along these
lines, two questions likely to confront an attorney dealing with this part of
the revised Act are: (1) Can a general partner hire a limited partner as
an employee and turn over to him the complete control of the business?
(2) Can a limited partner consult with or advise a general partner on a
daily basis as to the ongoing operations of the partnership? In answering
118. This approach varies from the approach of those states with statutes already provid-
ing for voting rights. In four of the states, Nevada, California, Oregon, and Washington, the
statutes provide that limited partners may vote on "matters affecting the basic structure of
the partnership, including the following matters or others of similar nature." See note 90
supra. Delaware has the only statute granting voting rights that does not contain such lan-
guage. Neither does it have language that expressly limits the voting rights to those specified
in the statute.
119. RULPA § 302, Commissioners' Comment.
120. Id. § 303(c).
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these questions a reading of section 303 and applicable case law indicates
that there are boundaries to the degree in which a limited partner may be
involved in the safe harbor activities.
Section 303(a) suggests that a limited partner cannot participate to the
extent that he is exercising, much like that of a general partner, day-to-day
control of the partnership. One of the apparent aims of section 303(a) is to
prevent a limited partner from being involved in the control of the busi-
ness to the same extent as a general partner.' 2' If the revised Act is to be
construed as a whole, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a limited
partner, in performing the permitted safe harbor activities, should also be
similarly restricted. To allow a partnership, for example, to hire a limited
partner for the purpose of running the business would be entirely inconsis-
tent with subsection (a).
In addition, granting a limited partner a great deal of control over the
day-to-day operations of the partnership would be out of line with the
remainder of the subsection (b) activities, particularly the voting privileges.
For instance, section 303(b)(5)(ii) provides that while a limited partner can
vote on whether an asset should be sold or whether future indebtedness
can be incurred, he may only do so other than in the ordinary course of
business. This implies that such decisions are generally to be left to the
discretion of the general partners. Thus, an interpretation of this statute
that would allow a partnership to hire one of its limited partners and per-
mit him to make decisions on which he could not even vote under section
303(b) would be at odds with the general intent of the provisions. The
same could also be said for permitting the limited partner to give advice on
such questions.
Judicial decisions under section 7 of the ULPA, which remain applica-
ble under the RULPA, 22 are also relevant to determining whether a gen-
eral partner can turn over the complete control of the business to a limited
partner employee and whether a limited partner can consult or advise a
general partner on a day-to-day basis as to the ongoing operations of the
partnership. In Gast v. Petsinger 23 the court held that the key in deter-
mining liability of a limited partner employee is the degree of control exer-
cised in the day-to-day functions of the business.' 24 If too great a degree
of control is found, the limited partner is liable as a general partner. Such
an approach is also apparent in other cases in which the question has been
presented. In Grainger v. Antoyan' 25 it was alleged that the limited part-
ner's position as a sales manager of the auto dealer partnership rendered
121. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
123. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974). In Gast a former project engineer of
the limited partnership sued for back pay and expenses. The plaintiff claimed that certain
limited partners were in fact general partners on the basis of their participation in the firm.
Two of the limited partners had been employed by the partnership as independent engineer-
ing consultants on certain projects. 323 A.2d at 374.
124. Id. at 375.
125. 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
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him personally liable. 126 The court ruled for the limited partner, however,
because the evidence established that he had little say in the actual ongo-
ing operations of the business. 27 The implication is that had more control
over the normal operations been exercised, he may have been found
financially accountable. In Silvola v. Rowlett128 the limited partner served
as a foreman in an auto repair shop and had on several occasions
purchased necessary parts and extended credit to people he knew. Unlim-
ited liability was not imposed, however, as the management of the business
was found to be still vested in the general partner.
129
The right of a limited partner to advise and consult seems similarly lim-
ited. In Silvola the advice sought by the general partner and given by the
limited partner pertained only to certain major transactions. 13  In both
Weil v. Diversified Properties13 ' and Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v. Woods Mill,
Ltd. 132 the limited partnerships involved were facing severe financial diffi-
culties; thus, the advice and consultation permitted by the courts occurred
in the context of an event out of the ordinary course of business. 133 None
of these cases should therefore be read as permitting a limited partner to
advise and consult with a general partner to a degree in which he has an
active voice in the normal operations of the business.
As a final consideration, section 303(b) should not be read as granting
exemption from liability to any limited partner who intentionally engages
in any fraudulent conduct while performing a safe harbor activity.
Neither section 303 nor the accompanying Commissioners' Comment ex-
pressly address this point. The Commissioners' Comment to section 208134
126. The limited partner had the authority to sell cars and had other salesmen working
under him. In addition, he was allowed to and did on several occasions co-sign checks. He
did not, however, have any authority as to (1) hiring or discharging personnel, (2) purchas-
ing new cars, (3) determining the selling price of cars and the trade-in allowances for cus-
tomers buying new cars, and (4) evaluating the credit worthiness of prospective customers.
313 P.2d at 850.
127. Id. at 853.
128. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954), noted in 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 98 (1954).
129. 272 P.2d at 289.
130. Id. at 289-90.
131. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1976). In Weil a general partner was seeking an action to
have the court declare the limited partners as general partners and for an appointment of a
receiver and an accounting. The partnership had been in severe financial straights. The
limited partners during this period had conferred amongst each other and with two individ-
uals who had taken over from the general partner the ongoing operations of the business.
Id. at 779-81.
132. 133 Ga. App. 411, 210 S.E.2d 866 (1974). The limited partnership was involved in
the construction of an apartment complex. Due to financial problems that arose during the
construction period, some of the limited partners consulted with the general partner. At
least one visited the construction site and complained about the way the work was being
done. 210 S.E.2d at 867.
133. As was stated by the court in Trans-Am Builders, Inc.: "It would be unreasonable to
hold that a limited partner may not advise with the general partner and visit the partnership
business, particularly when the project is confronted with a severe financial crises." 210
S.E.2d at 869.
134. Section 208 provides: "The fact that a certificate of limited partnership is on file in
the office of the Secretary of State is notice that the partnership is a limited partnership and




of the revised Act, however, appears to have some bearing on this matter,
although somewhat indirectly. It provides that while a limited partnership
certificate is constructive notice to third parties of the status of the desig-
nated individuals, it is not intended to change any liability of a limited
partner created by his action or inaction under estoppel, agency, or fraud.
An example of this would be where a limited partner, in serving as an
agent of the partnership, intentionally causes the party he was transacting
business with reasonably to believe that the limited partner was in fact a
general partner with unlimited liability for partnership obligations. While
under section 303 the limited partner would be performing one of the safe
harbor activites, the Commissioners' Comment on section 208 indicates
that the limited partner would be held to have liability as a general part-
ner.
C. Evaluation and Alternative Proposals
Section 303 of the revised Act does have certain desirable features. The
inclusion of the safe harbor activities will allow attorneys to function with
more certainty in setting up and advising limited partnerships.'35 In addi-
tion, by expressly granting limited partners the right to vote on certain
major matters, the new section assures the limited partners of not only
some input into the operations of the business, but also a better capacity to
maintain control over their investment. Section 303 also is an improve-
ment insofar as it specifies that a limited partner's liability under the "not
substantially the same as" test is limited to those creditors with knowledge
of his participation; however, many other questions concerning the extent
of a limited partner's liability once that partner is ruled to have liability
beyond his contribution are left unresolved.'
36
A major deficiency of section 303 is its considerable indefiniteness. One
such problem area is the question whether in a situation where a limited
partner exercises control, but not substantially the same as a general part-
ner, a third party creditor seeking to impose unlimited liability on the lim-
ited partner must demonstrate reliance.' 37 The literal language of section
303(a) suggests that reliance is not required; rather, the section speaks spe-
cifically in terms of actual knowledge of the limited partner's actions. Cer-
tain remarks in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note pertaining to whether
the third party has been misled to his detriment, however, indicate that
reliance is a necessary element to be demonstrated before unlimited liabil-
ity will be imposed. Another potential problem area is the difficulty of
ascertaining what conduct outside of the safe harbor provisions will sub-
ject a limited partner to liability beyond his contribution. As evidenced by
135. An attorney would still be faced with problems in advising a partnership under the
revised Act, particularly where a limited partner is an employee of or is giving advice to the
partnership. As noted, a limited partner may be restricted in the extent to which he may
participate while performing a safe harbor activity. See notes 121-33 supra and accompany-
ing text.
136. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.
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the hypothetical stated earlier, imposition of general partner liability for
partnership obligations may depend on whether a particular act or acts of
a limited partner fall within the terms of section 303(a) or section 303(c).
Finally, even if a limited partner's acts should be construed under section
303(a), the interpretational problem of whether the activity constitutes
conduct substantially the same or not substantially the same as that of a
general partner must be resolved. The revised Act provides no guidance as
to what these phrases mean. Moreover, both phrases seem ultimately as
ambiguous as control was under section 7 of the prior Act. As many of
these questions will have to be resolved by litigation, there may be a sub-
stantial delay before the case law can develop to provide a more definite
standard. Thus, the law in this area could continue to remain in doubt,
creating the possibility that decisions under this section will be inconclu-
sive and contradictory, giving rise to problems of the type that have made
section 7 so troublesome.
Section 303 also can be criticized as unfairly providing a "windfall" to
creditors of the business. When the limited partner's participation in con-
trol is substantially the same as a general partner's, unlimited liability can
be imposed regardless of whether the third party even knew of the limited
partner's existence at the time he transacted business with the partner-
ship.' 38 The possibility for a windfall may also exist in a situation where
the limited partner's control over partnership affairs is not like that of a
general partner. If in fact reliance on the part of a third party is not re-
quired to impose on a limited partner unlimited liability, a third party
need only show that he had knowledge of the limited partner's activity.
Thus, with this type of standard, the fact that the third party had or had
not been misled would be irrelevant. For example, in the hypothetical
stated earlier if a creditor knew the limited partner and was aware of his
limited liability status, yet was also aware that all purchases of the partner-
ship above a certain dollar limit had to have the assent of the limited part-
ner, under section 303(a) the limited partner could still be held to personal
liability for the debt owed the creditor. This would hold true despite the
fact that the limited partner's exercise of some measure of control in no
way confused the creditor as to the limited partner's status. Allowing such
a recovery when a third party is not even misled with regard to the liability
status of the limited partner appears to impose a rather harsh penalty,
which may in fact discourage use of the limited partnership by inves-
tors. 1
39
The question also arises as to whether the safe harbor provisions really
would provide a limited partner with any greater degree of security as to
his participation in the business."4 If the interpretation in this Comment
138. RULPA § 303(a). Note that this criticism is the same as that leveled at the power
test. See note 56 supra.
139. The validity of this criticism of § 303(a) is grounded on the idea that the purpose of
§ 303(a) is to protect third party creditors. If this in fact is the policy aim of§ 303(a), then as
drafted, creditors can potentially reap a windfall.
140. See notes 121-33 supra and accompanying text.
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of those activities is correct, there exist limits to the extent to which a lim-
ited partner can exercise control over the partnership even while engaged
in any of the exempt activities. Thus, the limited partner must be con-
stantly concerned with overstepping the line into impermissible participa-
tion.
As a final consideration, section 303, although an improvement, does not
deal adequately with the extent of a limited partner's liability once he is
found to have unlimited liability. As stated earlier, when a limited partner
is found to have participated in control, but not to the extent of exercising
control like that of a general partner, he has unlimited liability only to a
party with knowledge of his participation. Thus, if the limited partnership
had an obligation with a party who at the time of entering into the obliga-
tion had knowledge of a limited partner's control, presumably the limited
partner could have liability beyond his contribution on that obligation to
the party. Section 303, however, does not address the question whether
this unlimited liability extends to any prior and future obligations owed to
the party with knowledge. In addition, a similar criticism can be offered
with regard to when a limited partner has control like that of a general
partner over the affairs of the partnership. In this situation the limited
partner, if he began to exercise such control sometime after the inception
of the limited partnership, would have liability for all prior partnership
debts up to the amount of his capital contribution, plus would have unlim-
ited liability for all subsequent obligations. Suppose that a limited partner
after assuming control of this type for a short while relinquishes the con-
trol. Does he still retain personal liability on those debts incurred while in
control? Moreover, does he continue to remain personally liable on part-
nership obligations incurred after he relinquished control and returned to
limited partner status? Answers to these questions are hard to discern
from an examination of section 303. Clearly a more tightly drawn provi-
sion that addresses the above mentioned points is desirable.
In summary, analysis suggests that section 303 of the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, instead of being an improvement over section 7,
could turn out to be as deficient. Although the inclusion of the safe harbor
provisions would allow a greater degree of certainty as to the type of activ-
ities that can be performed by a limited partner, a substantial amount of
uncertitude would still exist as to the types of activities outside of the safe
harbor that would subject a limited partner to unlimited liabilty. In addi-
tion, due to the vagueness of the "substantially the same as" language, the
limited partner could never be sure when he had personal liability on all
partnership obligations, except in a situation in which he is in total control
of the day-to-day functions of the partnership. Moreover, assuming that
reliance is not required in a "not substantially the same as" situation, the
liability standard promulgated under section 303(a) will lead to the same
result as was reached in Delaney. That is, unlimited liability will be in-
curred by a limited partner regardless of whether or not the third party
involved was misled to his detriment on the limited partner's participation
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in control. As in Delaney, such an outcome seems unfair to the limited
partner and clearly inimical to the use of the limited partnership form as a
practical business entity.
One alternative to the approach suggested in the RULPA would be to
drop all restrictions on the amount of participation in control by the lim-
ited partner. Although allowing both limited liability and control appears
inconsistent with what was felt appropriate some sixty years ago when the
original Act was drafted, 4' it would not seem contrary to public policy
today. This is evidenced by the present use of closed corporations, which
offer an investor an opportunity to engage in the exercise of the manage-
ment of a corporate entity while at the same time enjoying limited liabil-
ity.' 4 2 Additional evidence of this is the increasing use of nonrecourse
financing, where liability is similarly limited. Nor would the rights of third
parties transacting business with the partnership be necessarily imperiled
by such a move. Many creditors have become aware of the use of limited
partnerships and of their nature. As added protection, limited partner-
ships could be required to identify themselves as such by their names and
in dealings with other parties.143 One commentator has expressed the be-
fief that this would be "the most effective way of communicating its status
to third persons trading with it."' If a limited partner did anything to
intentionally mislead a creditor into believing that he had general partner
liability, however, such liability could still be imposed. 145
Another alternative, not quite such a substantial break with tradition, is
to delete the language in section 303(a) pertaining to "actual knowledge"
and substitute a reliance factor in its place.146 In so doing, when a limited
partner has not participated in the control of the business to the same de-
gree as a general partner, and yet has performed some act of control that is
141. See notes 23 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
142. A close corporation is one whose voting shares are generally held by a single share-
holder or a small group of shareholders. It differs from a publicly held corporation in sev-
eral respects. First, there is no public issue of, or active trading in, the voting shares of a
closed corporation. In addition, corporate procedures are often less formalized. Finally, the
shareholders of a closed corporation are often active in the management of the business.
This is unlike the publicly held corporation where there exists a separation of ownership and
control, caused by a delegation of power by the stockholders to a board of directors. See H.
HENN, supra note 7, § 257.
Both close corporation shareholders and limited partners are similar in that they enjoy the
corporate characteristics of limited liability. They are different in the respect that close cor-
poration shareholders also enjoy the right to participate actively in the control and manage-
ment of their business.
143. At present, Florida is the only state that has such a requirement. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 620.05(l) (West 1977).
144. A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(b), at 145.
145. Id. § 26(c).
146. With a reliance requirement, § 303(a) would read essentially as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the
obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business. However, if the limited partner's participa-
tion in the control of the business is not substantially the same as the exercise
of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to persons who reasonably
believe that he is a general partner as a result of his participation in control.
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not included within the safe harbor provisions, the focus of any litigation
would center on whether a third party creditor had reasonably relied on
the limited partner's participation. The main advantage to adding a reli-
ance requirement is that it would partially eliminate the windfall element
that is inherent in the revised Act's standard.'47 In addition, such a re-
quirement would still help to clarify the extent of liability question, insofar
as the limited partner would have personal liability only to a party who
had relied to his detriment upon the acts in control.
A variation on the above alternative is to eliminate completely the "sub-
stantially the same as" language and simply combine a reliance test with
the safe harbor provisions. 148 The merit of this standard is that it would
avoid the confusion that could arise under the present section 303(a) as to
whether a limited partner's participation is or is not substantially the same
as that of a general partner; rather, attention would be directed to the
question whether the limited partner's activities outside of the safe harbor
were sufficient to cause reasonable reliance. 149 Moreover, such an ap-
proach would eradicate totally the possibility for any windfall by a third
party creditor.'5 0 The standard would allow a limited partner to exercise
control like a general partner over the partnership as long as there is no
reliance as a consequence. The propriety of this result depends on whether
it is felt that the enjoyment of such control in conjunction with limited
liability is an inappropriate combination.' 5 '
147. A certain degree of windfall, however, would still be present insofar as when the
limited partner's participation is substantially the same as that of a general partner he may
be found to have unlimited liability for partnership obligations regardless of whether a third
party relied on or even had knowledge of the participation. See note 99 supra.
148. Such a standard would read essentially as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the
obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business. However, if a limited partner takes part in
the control of the business, he will have unlimited liability only to those per-
sons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing
that he is a general partner as a result of his participation in control.
149. To reduce even further any confusion over a limited partner's participation, consid-
eration should also be given to dropping § 303(c). As observed, whether under § 303 a lim-
ited partner may be liable as a general partner when he performs an act outside of the safe
harbor list depends on if the activity is found to fall under § 303(a) or § 303(c). By eliminat-
ing subsection (c), while at the same time inserting the language pertaining to reliance, the
focus would be entirely on whether the limited partner's action outside the safe harbor
caused a third party to be misled to his detriment as to the true liability status of the limited
partner.
150. See notes 99 & 147 supra.
15 1. The State Bar of Texas has recently proposed legislation along these lines to the
66th session of the Texas Legislature. The proposal would amend § 8 of the Texas Uniform
Limited Partnership Act to provide that a limited partner will incur general partner liability
only to persons who transact business believing that the limited partner is a general partner.
The aim of the amendment is to eliminate by statute the strict construction given § 8 in
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). For a discussion of Delaney, see
notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the state bar is proposing the inclu-
sion of a nonexclusive list of safe harbor activities in which a limited partner may engage
without being deemed to have participated in control. The list of activities is essentially the
same as that included under the revised Act. Unlike the revised Act, however, the state bar's
proposal also provides that a limited partner may serve as an officer or director of a corpo-
rate general partner; this too can be viewed as a reaction to the holding in Delaney. Cole-
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III. CONCLUSION
The need to define the limited partner's role in the partnership business
more accurately is obviously a necessity. As it now stands, section 7 of the
ULPA and the judicial decisions construing it provide an inconclusive
guide as to the extent to which a limited partner may participate. Al-
though section 303 of the revised Act has certain desirable features, it fails
to rectify the situation completely. Its enactment will only lead to contin-
ued uncertainty in this area and protracted litigation. Consideration
should be given to its modification.
man, Proposed Amendments Texas Uniform Limited Partnershp Act, 42 TEX. B.J. 14, 14-15
(1979); see note 79 supra.
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